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IREDELL RECLAIMED: FAREWELL TO SNOWISS'S HISTORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW
GERALD LEONARD*

An unfortunate distortion has crept into the recent historiography of
judicial review. This distortion is not the doing of Larry Kramer, the
honoree of this symposium, but his accomplished history of the origins of
judicial review does its little bit to perpetuate it. I refer to the idea that the
early theorists of judicial review saw that practice as distinctively
"political-legal"' or a "substitute for revolution, ' 2 rather than a
straightforwardly legal or purely judicial practice. The modem source of
this idea is Sylvia Snowiss's influential book, JudicialReview and the Law
of the Constitution.3 Snowiss argues that virtually no one thought of the
Constitution as a source of judicially expoundable law until well into the
nineteenth century, after some decades of John Marshall's working his
magic on the United States Supreme Court.
The political scientist Dean Alfange methodically exposed many of
Snowiss's misreadings of evidence and corrected her major claims shortly
after the book's publication, 4 but that review has had surprisingly little
effect. Scholars have continued to echo Snowiss's argument right through
to the present and even, as in Kramer's case, when their own arguments
need not rely on any of Snowiss's claims. 5 I will not recapitulate Alfange's

* Professor, Boston University School of Law. Ph.D., 1992; J.D., 1995, University of Michigan.
My thanks to Mary Bilder for comments on this essay, to all the symposium participants for intellectual
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1. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW 63 (2004).
2. SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 50 (1990).

3. Id.
4. Dean Alfange, Jr., Marbury v. Madison and Original Understandingsof JudicialReview: In
Defense of Traditional Wisdom, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 329, 333-49 (1993).
5. In addition to Kramer, see, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Thayerian Deference to Congress and
Supreme Court Supermajority Rule: Lessons from the Past, 78 IND. L.J. 73, 80-81 (2003); William R.
Casto, James Iredell and the American Origins of Judicial Review, 27 CONN. L. REV. 329 (1995);
Matthew P. Harrington, JudicialReview Before John Marshall, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51, 88 (2003);
Samuel R. Olken, The Ironies of Marbury v. Madison and John Marshall'sJudicial Statesmanship, 37
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 391, 405 (2004); Gordon S. Wood, The Origins of JudicialReview Revisited, or
How the Marshall Court Made More out of Less, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 787 (1999). Harrington's
momentary echoing of Snowiss is especially perplexing because he otherwise offers a sensible reading
of Iredell not so different from my own.
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article here, but I do want to correct a part of Snowiss's book that Alfange
ignored and that Kramer implicitly endorses: Snowiss's treatment of James
Iredell of North Carolina, the man widely regarded as the most compelling
early theorist of judicial review. This essay is meant to reclaim what I think
is the proper and simple meaning of Iredell's work from Snowiss's
needless complications. In the process, perhaps it can reinforce Alfange's
more general effort to correct Snowiss's distortion of the early history of
judicial review.
I will take the first few pages below to criticize Kramer just a bit but
mostly to critique Snowiss's book. Then I will spend the balance of the
essay explicating Iredell's famous 1786 essay "To the Public." My reading
of Iredell will echo some traditional views of his work, clearing away what
I think are Snowiss's distortions, and then I will add what I hope are some
original insights into the meaning of his work.
I.

KRAMER AND SNOWISS

Kramer rightly attributes to Iredell the "most thoughtful presentation
of this new principle," the principle that courts might be relied on for
"constitutional enforcement." '6 He then goes on to offer a characteristically
sensible reading of Iredell's famous essay, "To the Public," in which he
emphasizes Iredell's premise that the judiciary, the same as the legislature,
acted as the people's constitutional agent and thus was required to
implement only constitutional statutes. 7 So far, so good. But I lose Kramer
when he says that judicial review was therefore understood by Iredell and
his like as a substitute for revolution: "Judicial review, in other words, was
not an act of ordinary legal interpretation. It was a political-perhaps we
should say a 'political-legal'-act of resistance."'8 Of course, there is a
grain of truth in this characterization, in the sense that all authorized acts of
government are substitutes for revolution; if the sovereign people did not
have their three branches exercising their delegated powers, they would be
left to a sort of permanent state of revolution. But there is not much
indication in Iredell's essay that he thought judicial review "political-legal"
rather than just "legal"-a straightforward judicial exercise of the
constitutional authority delegated to that branch. 9
KRAMER, supra note 1, at 60.
7. Id. 60-63.
8. Id. at 63.
9. Kramer inserted into the argument a nice quotation from the early case of Trevett v. Weeden,
which serves him comparatively well, at least better than Iredell's essay does, but that doesn't much
affect my point. See id. at 63 (citing JAMES M. VARNUM, THE CASE, TREVETT AGAINST WEEDEN 26
(Providence, John Carter 1787)).

6.
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Happily, not much in Kramer's argument actually rides on the
suggestion that Iredell thought judicial review "political-legal." His more
general history of the early, extrajudicial development of American
constitutionalism stands strong, leaving this distortion of Iredell as a
somewhat marginal mischaracterization. For Snowiss, however, on whom
Kramer relies only for this section, the distortion of Iredell played an
important and telling role.
Snowiss sought to show that, before Marshall, judicial review was not
thought a matter of applying law at all, at least not in any conventional
sense. For her, Iredell's argument is neatly of a piece with what she calls
"period 2" judicial review, characterized by the notion that the judiciary
should never expound but only notice the Constitution, exercising review
only as the first line of revolutionary resistance; judicial review was an act
of political resistance-not legal interpretation-by men who just
happened to be judges, compelled to come face to face with a legislative
usurpation. 10 If they refused to apply a statute to a case on constitutional
grounds, it was not because they had carefully expounded the law of the
Constitution and found it to preclude implementation of the statute at issue.
Rather, barred from expounding the Constitution at all, the judges could
refuse to implement a statute only when the legislative act flouted the
Constitution so flagrantly that its usurping character could be seen by all
without the least need for constitutional interpretation." l
This version of judicial review directly implied, for Snowiss, the
"doubtful case rule," the rule that declared the judiciary's unwillingness to
12
strike down a statute in any but the clearest cases of unconstitutionality.
This rule was frequently endorsed then (and more even today than is
normally recognized' 3), but it was rarely, if ever, explained by the judges
and often ignored. 14 For Snowiss, the rule was merely a corollary of the
assumption that judicial review was political rather than legal. If judges
could not construe or expound the Constitution (a legal activity), but could
refuse to implement statutes only when necessary as an act of political
resistance, then such an act--open resistance to constituted authority-

10. See, e.g., SNOWISS, supra note 2, at 73-74.

11. Id. at 45-89.
12. Id. at 63-65.
13. See Caminker, supra note 5, at 85-86.
14. For examples, see the line of Pennsylvania cases endorsing the rule with little explanation:
Moore v. Houston, 3 Serg. & Rawle 169, 178 (Pa. 1817); Commonwealth ex rel. O'Hara v. Smith, 4
Binn. 117, 126 (Pa. 1811); Emerick v. Harris, 1 Binn. 416, 423 (Pa. 1808); Respublica v. Duquet, 2
Yeates 493, 498 (Pa. 1799).
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could only be justified in such clear cases of usurpation as would justify
15
any faithful citizen's resistance.
Snowiss's argument is clever, but there is an alternative and much
simpler version of the early history. It is that judicial review rapidly gained
adherents by force of the legal logic of the Revolution, not by the positing
of some extra-legal, quasi-revolutionary role for the judges. As the
fundamental transition from legislative to popular sovereignty began to be
understood, 16 the legal logic of judicial review became quite powerful,
although never, of course, unanswerable. The new American constitutions
abandoned the legislative sovereignty that had made judicial review
unthinkable (more or less 1 7) under the English "constitution." With
sovereignty removed to the people, there was no necessary reason why the
legislatures should be immune to the judiciary's coordinate review,
although new arguments against judicial review would emerge in due
course. 18 Of course, there was a political aspect to such legal arguments as
there is to every legal argument. But Iredell's articulated claims for judicial
review were just the sort of legal and judicial arguments later made by
Marshall and others and generally taught in law schools today; they did not
justify the practice in political terms or in terms of revolutionary action but
simply as a product of the legal logic of popular sovereignty. As I will
argue below, Iredell actually contended that constitutional review grew
more or less naturally out of the judicial office, out of the most pedestrian,
uncontroversial understanding of a judge's work. He did not fail to see
what was special about this aspect of judging: that it was bound to attract
much more attention from the political branches than would most judicial
actions. But that did not alter his view that constitutional review lay
necessarily within the responsibilities of a judge as a matter of simple,

15. SNOWISS, supra note 2, at 63-65.
16. The standard and definitive study is GORDON S.WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 1776-1787 (1969).
17. Curiously, Iredell himself resists the weight of modem constitutional historiography by
suggesting that, although contrary to the general principles of the English constitution, even English
judges claimed they could control Parliament when a statute conflicted with "naturaljustice." See
Letter from James Iredell to Richard Spaight (Aug. 26, 1787), in 2 LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF
JAMES IREDELL 172, 172 (Griffith J. McRee ed., New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1858) [hereinafter LIFE
AND CORRESPONDENCE].

18. The most thorough and powerful argument against judicial review in the early republic,
although it failed completely in the end, was that of Pennsylvania's Justice John Gibson, dissenting in
Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawle 330, 343-58 (Pa. 1825) (Gibson, J., dissenting). Other resistance to
and arguments against judicial review from the period are collected in RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE
JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE YOUNG REPUBLIC (1971); KRAMER, supra note
1, at 65-72, 145-56; DONALD F. MELHORN, JR., "LEST WE BE MARSHALL'D": JUDICIAL POWERS AND
POLITICS IN OHIO, 1806-1812 (2003).
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honest, legal reasoning, not as a matter of political calculation nor implied
by the right of revolution.
Before developing Iredell's positive argument, though, I want to
explain the problems with Snowiss's use of evidence. Analyzing Iredell's
public letter, Snowiss points to the "core of Iredell's defense of judicial
authority over legislation" and acknowledges that one "could easily" read it
"as part of a single line of reasoning leading to Marbury and the doctrine
we accept today."' 19 After all, Iredell took it for granted that "the
constitution is a law of the State," in the same way "as an act of Assembly,"
except that the Assembly may repeal the latter but not the former.2 0 More
or less innovative at the time, 2 1 that reasoning became very familiar very
quickly and remains so today. 22 The Constitution was just like a statute, a
"law of the state," except that it happened to be superior, controlling law,
23
much as a later statute controls an earlier statute.
But Snowiss asserts that Iredell, understood in proper historical
context, meant something different-that judges must take notice of the
Constitution but never treat it as they would ordinary law by actually
interpreting it.24 Iredell never suggests this latter limitation on
constitutional review in any way in his argument, but Snowiss resorts to
this quotation from the essay: "The great argument [against judicial review]
is, that though the Assembly have not a right to violate the constitution, yet
if they in fact do so, the only remedy is, either... petition... or...
universal resistance. '25 Snowiss seems to imply that Iredell's choice of the

19. SNOWISS, supra note 2, at 49.
20. Id. at 48 (quoting James Iredell, To the Public (1786), in LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE, supra
note 17, at 145, 148).
21. Iredell's essay is generally thought foundational, but it did not come out of thin air. Willis
Whichard, for example, notes that Iredell's friend and mentor, Samuel Johnston, had put similar
arguments on paper a few years earlier. See WILLIS P. WHICHARD, JUSTICE JAMES IREDELL 12 (2000).
And Mary Sarah Bilder argues convincingly that the judicial role in reviewing statutes for repugnancy
to constitutions was widely presumed well before Iredell wrote. Mary Sara Bilder, The Corporate
Origins of Judicial Review, YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2006). Moreover, while admitting to Spaight that
many people shared an opposition to the practice, Iredell believed that, "Most of the lawyers. .. are of
my opinion .... " Letter from James Iredell to Richard Spaight, supra note 17, at 175-76.
22. See Marshall's famous passage in Marbury, noting that "[tihe question, whether an act,
repugnant to the constitution, can become the law of the land, is a question deeply interesting to the
United States; but, happily, not of an intricacy proportioned to its interest." Marshall goes on, of course,
to argue simply that the Constitution is law, just as a statute is, but that the Constitution is superior in
authority, just like Iredell's argument. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 176-80 (1803). As
William Nelson argues, that part of Marshall's opinion raised little excitement at the time, and, of
course, it remains a standard citation for the legitimacy and logic of judicial review today. See WILLIAM
E. NELSON, MARBURY V. MADISON: THE ORIGINS AND LEGACY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (2000).
23. Iredell, supranote 20, at 148.
24. SNOWISS, supranote 2, at 51.
25. Id. at 48 (quoting !redel, supra note 20, at 147).
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phrase "in fact" somehow suggested that he excluded from judicial review
those cases where the legal meaning of the Constitution would actually
need expounding, and included only those where the obvious popular
meaning of the Constitution-the "in fact" of constitutional meaning?rendered a statute unconstitutional. 26 Her other source of comfort is that
Iredell worked off a case-a denial of jury trial-in which the
unconstitutionality was indeed, she thinks, so clear as to obviate all
interpretive activity. 27 But the obviousness of that case-if it was so-hardly alters the apparent meaning of Iredell's characterization of the
Constitution as a "law of the state," judicially cognizable like any other law
of the state. Nor does Iredell's use of the merely intensifying phrase "in
fact." Snowiss nevertheless asserts without evidence that, for Iredell,
"[e]nforcement of fundamental law was a political act, a peaceful substitute
for revolution presented as a superior alternative to petition or universal
resistance, '28 not the straightforward application of law that Iredell's
language seems to imply. She rightly suggests that nothing in Iredell
implied that judges had exclusive control over the Constitution. 2 9 But that
is irrelevant to the claim that Iredell justified judicial review only as an act
of political resistance.
The odd, forced character of Snowiss's reading of Iredell continues
with her recognition that Iredell derived the power of judicial review
specifically from the judges' obligation to decide lawsuits, the core of
(apolitical) judicial power. To decide cases, of course, the judge had to
figure out how any ostensibly applicable laws (cases, statutes,
constitutional provisions) actually interacted to produce a governing rule
for the case at hand. Presumably, this obligation would entail interpreting
all the plausibly applicable laws. Snowiss recognizes that that is true of
sub-constitutional law, 30 and Iredell never suggested otherwise for
constitutional law. But Snowiss just asserts that, "Restriction of judicial
review to a lawsuit underscored the point that [judicial review] grew out of
the judiciary's exclusive responsibility to expound ordinary law."'3 1 It is
hard to see why she decides to insert the adjective "ordinary" here; Iredell
never used that adjective or any equivalent. Why did she not say instead
that judicial review grew out of the judge's obligation to apply all relevant
law, "ordinary" or constitutional, and thus to expound all of that law in
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 50.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 50-51.
Id. at 53.
Id. (emphasis added).
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order to decide the cases? Certainly, that is the easiest understanding of
Iredell.
At the risk of straying beyond my topic, I might observe that
Snowiss's forced readings continue with a discussion of St. George
Tucker's opinion in Kamper v. Hawkins.32 In rhetoric much like Iredell's,
Tucker explicitly identified the Constitution as "the first law of the land"
and therefore pertinent whenever the judiciary must "expound what the law
is.... [H]ow can any just exposition be made, if that which is the supreme
law of the land be withheldfrom [the judges'] view?" 33 The natural reading
of this passage, of course, is that Tucker, as a judge, must expound all the
plausibly applicable law-cases, statutes, constitutions-to figure out
"what the law is" that will govern the case. 34 Tucker could have gone on to
say that he meant only sub-constitutional law when he said "law," except
that he had already identified the Constitution itself as "the first law of the
land" and did not suggest that he meant to distinguish it from other sorts of
"law" except in terms of hierarchical position. Snowiss was kind enough to
do it for him, though, inserting "ordinary" as a qualifier of law where
35
Tucker had not.
The one consideration I can imagine that could make Snowiss's
argument plausible is that the exposition of cases and statutes might not
have seemed as readily the joint property of the three branches as the
development of constitutional law did. Perhaps that would serve to limit
Iredell's and the judiciary's understanding of the scope of permissible
judicial review. But it is easy enough to make the argument that every
branch must expound ordinary law in carrying out its duties in the same
way it must expound constitutional law. More importantly, Tucker and
Iredell simply did not employ this line of reasoning or articulate the
distinction that Snowiss asserts.
II.

IREDELL'S ESSAY

Contrary to Snowiss's account of Iredell, I think the easy and natural
reading of Iredell is that a judge should act exactly as a judge: applying the
operative law as he understands it. Even more than today (a few modern
ultra-formalists aside), constitutional thinkers in the founding years worried
obsessively about the problem of distinguishing between legislative and
judicial (and executive) power. Resistance to judicial review in the 1780s
32. 3 Va. (I Va. Cas.) 20 (1793).
33. Id. at 78-81.
34. SNOWISS, supra note 2, at 54 (quoting Tucker's opinion in Kamper, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) at 78).
35. Id. at 55.
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often rested on the grounds that to void a statute was to perform a
legislative rather than a judicial act. 36 Iredell argued instead that refusal to
implement a legislative act on constitutional grounds was a strictly judicial
act.
He began with a vigorous rehearsal of the basic principle of American
constitutionalism: that the power of the legislature to make laws extended
just as far as "the deliberate voice of the people," manifested in the
constitution, had determined it should and no farther. 37 Specifically, the
people of North Carolina, like those of every other state, had revolted
against "the omnipotent power of the British Parliament" and would then
"have been guilty of the basest breach of trust, as well a, the grossest folly,
if in the same moment.., we had established a despotic power among
ourselves. '38 On this point, he expected no controversy. All agreed that
"the power of the Assembly is limited and defined by the constitution," that
"the Assembly have not a right to violate the constitution. ' 39 There
remained disagreement, however, on the question of what was to be done
when the Assembly "in fact do so." 40 Iredell's own answer, of course, was
that judicial review must play at least an important part. But he first had to
dispose of "[t]he great argument" that the only options were the leftovers of
British Whig constitutionalism, "a humble petition that the law may be
repealed, or a universal resistance of the people," leaving the Assembly's
41
ostensible "law" to control the judges in the meantime.
The first of these Lockean 4 2 options he deemed an absurdity in a
system where the people, not the legislature, were sovereign. In England, a
people's petition with appropriate marks of humility might be the only
legal alternative to revolutionary upheaval. But the point of the Revolution,
as Iredell had made clear in his preamble, was to remove sovereignty-the
ultimate lawmaking authority-from the legislature to the people. In
America, it was entirely within the people's legal rights to disregard an
unconstitutional law and entirely inappropriate for them to petition their
inferiors in the lawmaking process.
So, as a practical matter, what were the people to do? What, to put it
another way, had their constitutions already marked out as the remedy in
such a circumstance? Yes, the "whole people may resist" when necessary.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 1, at 58.
Iredell, supra note 20, at 145-47.
Id. at 146.
Id. at 146-47.
Id. at 147.
Id.
See Casto, supra note 5, at 334.
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But that was neither a practical remedy nor, consequently, the one that the
people themselves had chosen. Not only was universal resistance a
"dreadful expedient," but even the most flagrantly unconstitutional
measures would not engender it as long as their ill effects stung only a
minority, as long as they fell short of "universal oppression." Iredell
observed that "[a] thousand injuries may be suffered, and many hundreds
ruined, before this can be brought about. '43 Certainly, the people had not
chosen an enforcement mechanism that must necessarily leave a thousand
usurpations unredressed.
In subsequent paragraphs, Iredell continued to develop the absurdities
of universal resistance as an enforcement measure, but only as a prelude to
his main theoretical point: such a Lockean right of revolution, like the
alternative of a humble petition to the legislature, belonged to the
abandoned constitution of England, not to the constitutions adopted since
the Revolution. Reliance on "universal resistance," he said, "is evidently
derived from the principle of unbounded legislative power, that I have
noticed before, and that our constitution reprobates .... As little, I trust, is
the government of Great Britain to influence in other things, equally
inconsistent with our condition, and equally preposterous as these." 44 That
is, the whole notion of universal resistance as a device for the enforcement
of justice came from Britain and from the prior British assumption that
sovereignty lay in the legislature, an assumption foreign to the American
system. So the difficulty was not just a matter of the practicalities of
enforcement but a matter of proper interpretation of the people's
revolutionary history and their choice to implement their newly won
sovereignty in a constitution of separated, delegated, limited powers.
Finally, in a subsequent letter to Richard Spaight, then sitting as a
member of the 1787 Convention, Iredell acknowledged that frequent
elections might prove a valuable enforcement mechanism for the people's
constitution. But even Spaight, an opponent of judicial review, had
despaired of the adequacy of elections. So Iredell deemed them
of very little consequence, because this would only secure the views of a
majority; whereas every citizen in my opinion should have a surer pledge
for his constitutional rights than the wisdom and activity of any
occasional majority of his fellow-citizens, who,
4 5 if their own rights are in
fact unmolested, may care very little for his.
This passage brings out Iredell's special sensitivity to the problem of
individual rights, which reinforced the idea that the Constitution needed the
43. Iredell, supra note 20, at 147.
44. Id. at 147-48.
45. Letter from James Iredeli to Richard Spaight, supra note 17, at 175.
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judiciary to expound its meaning, not just popular majorities. But it also
remained consistent with his understanding of the Constitution as a matter
of popular sovereignty. Elections might be perfectly appropriate
enforcement mechanisms under a popular constitution, but they were far
from perfect expressions of the abiding constitutional will of the people,
and in any case there was no reason to think elections the exclusive
mechanism.
Once more, then, Iredell returned to the question of what the
constitution did contemplate as an enforcement mechanism and, more
particularly, "whether the judicial power hath any authority to interfere in
[a constitutional] case."'46 When so put, the answer seemed obvious (even if
in these early days few had "extended their ideas" to all the nuances of
judicial review 4 7 under popular sovereignty). After all, the "duty of [the
judicial] power ...is to decide according to the laws of the State."'48 And,
"[i]t will not be denied, I suppose, that the constitution is a law of the State"
just like "an act of Assembly, with this difference only, that it is the
fundamental law, and unalterable by the legislature, which derives all its
''49 For Snowiss, the adjective "fundamental" imports
powers from it.
something irreducibly political that makes the law of the Constitution
immune to judicial interpretation, but Iredell explained the significance of a
law's being "fundamental" quite differently and quite explicitly. For him,
in the context of a. lawsuit, the "only" difference between "fundamental
law" and "an act of Assembly" was the former's hierarchical superiority,
such that the latter could not be taken by a judge to control his decision in
the face of contrary constitutional law. The point became all the more
unmistakable by virtue of Iredell's analogizing it to the problem of
conflicting statutes. Faced with clashing statutes, the judge simply had to
determine which one controlled the case, the judicial rule generally being
that the later statute would control. A constitutional case presented an
analogous instance of conflicting laws and was resolvable by a different but
analogous rule: constitutional law controls statutory law.
The argument did not rest on an idea that "fundamental" law was
somehow "political" rather than ordinarily legal, nor on the idea that judges
might serve as a revolutionary avant-garde. Rather, it rested simply and
clearly on an understanding of judicial power within a popular constitution:

46.
47.
(1782)).
48.
49.

Iredell, supra note 20, at 148.
See KRAMER, supra note 1, at 62 (quoting Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) 5, 17
Iredell, supra note 20, at 148.
Id.
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"The judges, therefore, must take care at their peril, that every act of
Assembly they presume to enforce is warranted by the constitution, since if
it is not, they act without lawful authority. This is not a usurped or a
discretionary"-read "political"_"power, but one inevitably resulting
from the constitution of their office, they being judgesfor the benefit of the
whole people, not mere servants of the Assembly."'50 In short, the judges
must decide cases-their characteristically judicial function-according to
state law, not least the controlling law of the people's constitution, and so
they could hardly avoid engaging in constitutional review whenever a
litigant raised a constitutional question. Snowiss's contrary position may
have been taken by someone at the time, but Iredell at least treated
"fundamental" law as entirely "ordinary"-and thus presumably subject to
interpretation by judges-in all respects except its hierarchical superiority
51
to statute law.
It may be worth observing in this connection that Iredell also seems to
have assumed a fairly broad scope for judicial review, not one overly
cramped by fears that the power was an extra-judicial one. For example,
historians have sometimes thought that the early practice of judicial review
was meant to extend no further than the judiciary's defense of its own
constitutional "rights"-language that might suggest a very narrow power
in no way comparable to later judicial review's concern with constitutional
rights more generally. 52 But Iredell pretty clearly indicated a broad power
of review, not unlike the modem practice. For him, the issue was explicitly
the rights of individual citizens, not just those of the judiciary as such. And
his quite explicit focus on judicial protection for the legal rights of the
individual was entirely consistent with Kramer's and William Treanor's 53
50. Id.
51. Iredell immediately went on to reply to several anticipated objections. First, he pointed out
that the de facto dependency of the judges on legislative good will for retention of their offices and
salaries made the judicial power of constitutional review no serious threat to the legislature's own
rights. In fact, the judiciary probably remained too dependent to carry out all its functions with
sufficient impartiality. Second, anticipating arguments that took Iredell's apparently departmentalist
position to an extreme (for a modem example of extreme departmentalism, see Michael Stokes Paulsen,
The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994)), he
seemed to implicitly accept that the executive, too, must have a power of considering the
constitutionality of any acts it was asked to perform by other branches. But he rejected the idea that the
executive might reconsider the judiciary's judgments. Because "the power ofjudging rests with the
courts," the sheriff "and other ministerial officers" must accept those judgments and carry out their
offices accordingly. Iredell, supra note 20, at 149. Presumably, although Iredell did not elaborate, the
sheriff might, in effect, review a judicial order that impinged on executive power, such as the decision
precisely how he would enforce a judgment, but he could not reconsider a "judicial" judgment in a case
any more than a court could reconsider a legislative policy choice made within constitutional bounds.
52. See, e.g., William Michael Treanor, Judicial Review Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REv. 455,
470 (2005).
53. Id.at 498-503,541-46.
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demonstrations that the pattern of early judicial review included many
cases that had little to do with the judiciary's own rights-that is, little to
do with questions of judicial process or even jury rights.
Not only does Iredell's argument help bury the idea that early judicial
review was narrowly about the judiciary's own rights, but his precise
language helps explain the true meaning of the sources that have suggested
that supposition. What did James Wilson and others mean when they said
that the judiciary must have the power of "defending their constitutional
rights"? 54 Iredell said that the judges act "at their peril" if they fail to
ensure the constitutionality of every statute they enforce, lest they find
themselves coercing litigants "without lawful authority." 55 He thereby
reminded the judges that, should legal authorization be lacking, their every
coercion of a litigant was itself a violation of the law. To hide behind the
legislature's mere assertion that it had enacted a law, notwithstanding its
actual unconstitutionality, was to act in both a cowardly and an illegal
fashion. I think it is easy enough, then, to see how the exercise of judicial
review could be understood as the defense of a judicial "right" to exercise
only judicial power and not to be reduced to a slave of a usurping
legislature. The defense of the judge's own liberty and dignity-the
judiciary's own rights-thus became equivalent to the defense of every
individual's liberty and dignity, every individual's constitutional rights.
Finally, conspicuously missing from Iredell's pathbreaking argument
for judicial review was any mention of the doubtful case rule, the corollary
of Snowiss's political theory of period 2 judicial review. Kramer suggests
that Iredell's (and others') later embrace of the rule should be understood
as a "logical corollary" of the rationale for judicial review itself, 56 but I
don't think so. The logic of Iredell's argument, in fact, might well suggest
de novo review of constitutionality for several reasons: the Constitution's
status as paramount law presumably called for it to have its full scope
rather than contracting before the inferior law of the legislature; Iredell
treated the Constitution simply as ordinary (though paramount) law, fully
within judicial competence; and even practical considerations suggested
that the real danger lay in usurpations by legislative majorities rather than
by too bold judicial use of constitutional review. 57 But Iredell simply did
not consider the issue until responding to objections from a correspondent
the following year, and that delay is important.
54. See id. at 470 (quoting 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 73 (Max
Farrand ed., 1911)).
55. Iredell, supra note 20, at 148.
56. KRAMER, supra note 1, at 65.
57. Iredell, supra note 20, at 148-49.
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In 1787, a three-judge panel in Bayard v. Singleton vindicated
58
Iredell's argument for judicial review and invalidated the statute at issue.
Writing to Iredell from Philadelphia that August, where he represented
North Carolina in the Constitutional Convention, Richard Dobbs Spaight
objected vigorously to the judges' action. 59 He must not have known
Iredell's position on the matter, because he walked right into Iredell's
previous arguments as if he had never heard them before. Denying that
there was "any thing in the Constitution, either directly or impliedly, that
will support them, or give them any color of right to exercise that
authority" and decrying the absurdity of any judiciary's having "an
absolute negative on the proceedings of the Legislature," he complained
that the judges' exercise of constitutional review "united in their own
persons the legislative and judiciary powers, which no monarch in Europe
enjoys." ' 60 Spaight did not doubt the legislature's tendency to enact
oppressive and unconstitutional measures, but he could not conceive that
judicial review, an innovation that was "contrary to the practice of all the
world"-as if popular sovereignty were not-might be the answer. He saw
the state constitution's provision for annual elections as the only remedy,
61
although he acknowledged its inadequacies.
There are, of course, weighty arguments for Spaight' s bottom line. But
Spaight, at this point, had not grappled with Iredell's more sophisticated
arguments for judicial review as a vindication of the separation of powers.
He remained stuck on the idea that it was instead a violation of that
principle, a consolidation of "the legislative and judiciary powers." Older
models of sovereignty persisted in Spaight's mind as they did in the minds
of so many who nominally embraced popular sovereignty but translated
that principle immediately into a de facto legislative sovereignty. 6 2 That
translation rested on the legislature's status as the branch closest to the
people, but it also rested, intentionally or not, on the heritage of legislative
sovereignty that had provided Americans with their main model of
governance. Iredell tried to point out that the Revolution and the
subsequent years of constitution-making had rejected the heritage of
parliamentary sovereignty in favor of an entirely new set of principles that
could not be informed by simple importation of "the practice of all the

58. 1 N.C. (Mart.) 5 (1787).
59. Letter from Richard Dobbs Spaight to James Iredell (Aug. 12, 1787), in
CORRESPONDENCE, supranote 17, at 168, 169.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 169-70.
62. Cf KRAMER, supra note i, at 58-59.

LIFE AND

CHICA GO-KENT LA W REVIEW

(Vol 81:867

world."'63 But even Founders like Spaight were having trouble with the new
principles.
In any case, Iredell responded to Spaight mainly with a reiteration of
the points made in his newspaper essay but also with several important
additional nuances touching on the doubtful case rule. First, he made all the
more explicit his contention that judicial review, far from being an exercise
of legislative power, was inevitably implied in any exercise of judicial
power: because the Constitution was a 'fundamental law, and a law in
writing..., the judicial power, in the exercise of their authority, must take
notice of it as the groundwork of that as well as of all other authority." It
simply made no sense for the judges, as the people's agents, to attempt to
enforce a law "to which ... the people owe no obedience." And he
emphasized that this judicial power did not elevate the judiciary above the
legislature by giving the former a free-ranging, political power to review
the latter's work. "It is not that the judges are appointed arbiters, and to
determine as it were on any application, whether the Assembly have or
have not violated the Constitution; but when an act is necessarily brought
in judgment before them, they must, unavoidably, determine one way or
another. '64 Here, as in his essay, Iredell offered a logic that suggested not a
rule of deference to the legislature but full judicial power over
constitutional meaning just insofar as the constitution bore on the outcome
of a litigation.
But, second, out of nowhere, Iredell did produce and embrace a
doubtful case rule. Having noted again the inevitability of judicial review
and the unlikelihood of its abuse, he suddenly observed that "[i]t is a
subject indeed of great magnitude, and I heartily lament the occasion for its
discussion. In all doubtful cases, to be sure, the Act ought to be supported:
it should be unconstitutional beyond dispute before it is pronounced
such."'65 Why? He had previously acknowledged that the power of judicial
review, like any power, was susceptible to abuse and that "in a doubtful
matter [the danger of abuse] may be of great weight. '66 But, rather than
derive a general rule of restraint from that susceptibility to abuse, he went
on to show how little susceptibility there really was, largely because of the
judiciary's de facto dependence on the legislature. 67 Then, when he did
endorse a doubtful case rule in these remarks to Spaight, he rested simply
63. Letter from Richard Dobbs Spaight to James Iredell, supra note 59, at 169.
64. Letter from James Iredell to Richard Spaight, supra note 17, at 173 (containing all the
quotations cited in this paragraph).
65. Id. at 175.
66. Id. at 173-74.
67. Id. at 175.
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on the concession that the whole subject was of "great magnitude." I can
only read this as a practical concession to win over an opponent. He
understood that, although most lawyers saw the issue as he did, "many
[non-lawyers] think as you [Spaight] do upon this subject," and so he
offered up a doubtful case limitation. He thus implied that the judges
should not use the power very aggressively lest they face the sorts of
political consequences that he had described in explaining their dependency
on the legislature. To Spaight, he was saying that the judges' dependency
rendered them safer than Spaight supposed-probably too safe for the just
protection of individual rights-and that in any case the judges should and
would restrict themselves to very clear cases. To himself, he was making
the merely pragmatic argument that the judges might best reserve the
power for the clearest cases until the public had come around to the
inevitability of judicial review. To that end, perhaps the judges should only
fire when broad political support might be expected. Conspicuously lacking
was any basis for deference in the principles of separation of powers and
popular sovereignty that had driven his argument for judicial review in the
first place.
CONCLUSION
To understand the early days of judicial review accurately, it is
important to see that Iredell's foundational argument was a straightforward
explication of a change in the location of sovereignty and its legal
implications. The transition from British, Lockean, Whig constitutional
theory, locating sovereignty in the legislature, to American constitutional
theory, locating sovereignty in the people, impelled a shift in the relations
between legislative and judicial power. The central implication for the
courts was that they could no longer hide behind legislative authority; the
legislature was no longer sovereign and could neither immunize nor coerce
the judges, except as authorized by the people themselves. The judiciary
now had to ensure its own authority to act-protect its own "rights"-by
reference to the people's constitutions. It had to intervene, as necessary, to
protect the people's rights against legislative overreaching, lest it act
illegally itself. And there was nothing in such a theory to suggest deference
to the legislature, a doubtful case rule. Or, if there was, it was to be
developed somewhat later (a story for another article). For the time being,
the doubtful case rule appeared not as a "corollary" of the more general
theory of judicial review, but as a pragmatic accommodation to Americans'
lingering resistance to Iredell's lawyerly logic.
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The evidence from Iredell, therefore, suggests that there never was a
"period 2" in the history of judicial review. There was indeed a very
political history of constitutional review, forcefully told and firmly
substantiated in Kramer's book. Then, as now, constitutional issues were
68
hashed out in popular and legislative politics as much as in the courts.
Then, as now, judicial decisions confined themselves to the rhetoric of law
even as they obviously made substantive political judgments in order to
decide cases where the law was not clear (or sometimes even when it was).
When Iredell and others worked out a compelling legal argument for
judicial review, it did not mean that politics was irrelevant to the cases or
that they thought it was. But it did mean that, contrary to Snowiss's claim,
the history of judicial review rested on the early establishment of a cogent
legal argument for that power as an ordinary, utterly conventional aspect of
the judiciary's obligation to expound the law in order to decide casesordinary and conventional at least once the transition from legislative to
popular sovereignty was well understood.
Neither Iredell's writings nor most of the rest of Snowiss's evidence
supports her claim that the early theorists of judicial review thought the
application of constitutional law categorically more political and less
judicial than the application of other sorts of law. Nothing suggests that
judicial review was any more a "substitute for revolution" than any other
exercise of governmental power was. Nor can I find any reason to suppose
that the "doubtful case" rule expressed this quasi-revolutionary quality of
judicial review rather than mere political prudence or pragmatic deference
to the legislature. 69 Fortunately, we now have Larry Kramer's The People
Themselves, which should be taken generally to supplant Snowiss. Though
not without its faults, Kramer's book is helping to launch a far more
productive round of research into the history of judicial review than we
70
have seen in quite some time.

68. See, among many others in the recent spate of works on the history of constitutionalism
outside the courts, DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: DEMOCRATS AND WHIGS,
1829-1861 (2005); GERALD LEONARD, THE INVENTION OF PARTY POLITICS: FEDERALISM, POPULAR
SOVEREIGNTY, AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN JACKSONIAN ILLINOIS (2002); KEITH E.
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING

(1999); Gerald Leonard, Party as a "PoliticalSafeguard of Federalism": Martin Van Buren and the
Constitutional Theory of Party Politics, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 221 (2001); Gary D. Rowe,
Constitutionalism in the Streets, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 401 (2005).
69. See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of ConstitutionalLaw,
7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 138-52 (1893).
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